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Brotherhood v. Publix Cab Co., presents a set of kaleidoscopic
facets that, it is to be hoped, will not soon recur.', After a caution
as to limited applicability of its decision to other situations, 36 the
court concluded with reference to only a few of the conflicts and
ambiguities as follows: 1
Where, as in this case, the record shows the absence of any
negotiations having taken place, or a dispute having occurred, or a
statement of grievances having been submitted by the individuals
striking and picketing to the individuals against whom the strike has
been called and against whom the pickets are presumably picketing,
we say that it is against the public interest to allow such picketing
because a bona fide dispute has not been shown to exist.
The quest for certainty in this field is rewarding in neither
state nor national jurisdiction. Could it be that the legal problem
has a political aspect and thus will be solved more easily after a
few more Supreme Court vacancies are filled, or, perhaps, after
November 4, 1952?
AGUIDETO THE TRIAL OF AN EMPLOYEE SUIT
UNDER THE WAGE AND HOUR LAW
EDWARD H. SHERMAN
of the Denver Bar
This article has been prepared primarily to aid the general
practitioner who is called upon either to sue or defend a claim
arising out of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The busy practi-
tioner faced with an employee suit for these claims is bewildered
by the maze of statutory, judicial, and administrative rulings. He
has not had many occasions to delve into a new field of law which
in a short time has developed into a complexity of rules and de-
cisions which compare to that developed in other fields in over
a hundred years. This article does not presume to be a treatise
on the law. It does not claim to be exhaustive. It will deal with
substantive law only incidentally. The object is to point out cer-
tain common problems of procedure and practice which you will
probably face when you sue for an employee or defend his em-
ployer.
Let us assume that you represent the employee. He seeks to
recover minimum wages or overtime pay which his employer
21 119 Colo. 208,, 202 P. 2d 154 (194i).
s Two attempts at strike votes were "unsuccessful"; union collective bargaining
authorizations and revocations circulated like counterfeit bills; an unheralded strike
was called; the union officials said the strike was against the owner-drivers, but all
the strikers except one said it was against Publix Cab Co. ; no attempt had been made by
the union to negotiate with the owner-drivers against whom the officials said the strike
was called and whom the union at the same time purported to represent. Controversy
raged as to who represented whom, who was employed by whom and for what purpose,
and which statute if any was applicable.
so In which the writer respectfully joins.
S' Supra, n. 34 at 217.
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denied him and which he claims to be entitled to under the Act.
You have carefully examined the facts, and now you must decide
whether he is entitled to the minimum wage or overtime pay
benefits which the law provides. You carefully examine the sub-
stantive provisions of the FLSA, as amended,' and as affected by
the Portal-to-Portal Act.2 You now know generally that the client
is entitled to minimum wages and overtime pay as prescribed by
the law if he was engaged in interstate commerce, in production
for commerce, or in an occupation closely related and needed for
this production. You have learned that the present minimum rate
for employees within the scope of the Act is 75 cents an hour and
that the employer must pay for time worked in excess of 40 hours
weekly at a rate of 1!/2 times the regular rate. You realize that
the first and basic problem is whether the client is covered by the
Act. The particular activities of the client is the decisive ulti-
mate test. Here you cannot stop with the statute. You must con-
sider thousands of definitions and rulings which try to determine
coverage in various cases. You have further carefully examined
the exemptions from the Act which, under the amendments of
1949, have been redefined and greatly expanded. You will search
the administrative rulings on which many exemptions are based.
Let us now assume that you have determined that your employee
is covered by the Act and that his activities or those of his em-
ployer are not exempt. The next problem is to determine what
relief is available to the employee.
EMPLOYEE HAS CHOICE OF REMEDIES
Your employee will have a choice between three types of
suits, but he must choose between them. You may advise him that
he could waive his right to bring suit and make an agreement to
accept from the employer payments of the amount which is due
him under the supervision of the administrator of the Wage and
Hour Division. Under Section 16(c) of the amended Act, he may
consent to suit brought by the administrator on his behalf, but if
he does this he cannot bring a suit on the same claim, either in-
dividually or collectively. His other choices are an individual suit
in his own name or a collective suit brought by a fellow employee
for his benefit and other employees similarly situated. A final
judgment in any of these types of suits will obviously be a bar
to bringing another type of suit on the same cause of action, and
if the employee consents to suit by the administrator, he gives up
his right to liquidated damages and attorney's fees which he would
otherwise have in the other types of suits. The employee would
be wiser to sue in his own right under Section 16(b) or to join
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1,38 and Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949,
29 U.S.C. 201-219, as amended.
- Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. 251-263.
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with others in a collective action brought for the benefit of them-
selves and other employees similarly situated. The mere threat
of liquidated damages and attorney fees imposed, is alone a power-
ful weapon for an adjustment. Let us assume, therefore, that you
have decided to proceed by an individual suit or a collective one
for the employee. In the process of litigation you will surely face
many of the problems which are set out below.
PROPER PARTIES TO THE ACTION
Your employee is the real party in interest, and the action
should be maintained by him for and in behalf of himself or other
employees similarly situated and by other employees who have
joined him in a group action. The Portal-to-Portal Act, which
became effective May 14, 1947, prohibits an action by a non-em-
ployee representative. You can no longer designate a union or
other representative to maintain the action for the employee. The
Portal-to-Portal Act also prohibits assignment of "portal" wage
claims not compensable by contract, custom or practice which
arose prior to May 14, 1947. If it were not for this, it would seem
that an assignee would be a proper party3 . A person who is not
an employee cannot file a suit under Section 16 (b) as a representa-
tive or agent of an employee or on behalf of all employees similarly
situated; however, other employees may join your client in bring-
ing a collective suit. In order to become a party plaintiff to a
suit, the employee must give his consent in writing which must be
filed in the court where the action is brought. No time limit is set
forth within which the employee must file his written consent
(Sec. 7, Portal-to-Portal Act). The problem is somewhat analagous
to interventions in which employees similarly situated were al-
lowed to intervene where they desire to become parties to the
action. It is interesting to note that one court construed Section
16 (b) of the Act as providing a permissive joinder device whereby
employees with individual claims could present them simultane-
ously to avoid much litigation, a procedure which was not "a
true class suit."4 Employees similarly situated, who are not joined
as parties nor represented by employees who are parties to the
suit, have been held not to be bound by the judgments. Thus, you
may bring an action for your employee and all other employees
similarly situated and may join other employees whose claims may
be separate and distinct if they otherwise consent to become par-
ties to the action. The words "similarly situated" do not mean
identically situated nor do they limit the participants to the action
to those employees who are of the same class or department as the
plaintiff.' It is important that in collective suits the employee
3 Frisch v. Zelart Drug Co'., 46 N.Y.S. 2d 44 (1943).
SPentlan,! v. D)ravo Corp., 152 Fed. 2d 851 (3rd Cir. 1945).
6Shain v. Armour & Co., 40 F. Supp. 488 (D.C. Ky. 1941); McNichols V. Lenno,
Furnace Co., 7 F.R.D. 40 (D.C.N.Y.. 1947); Wright v. U.S. Rubber Co., 69 F. Supp.
621 (D.C. Iowa 1946).
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should give his consent in writing to become a party plaintiff and
file this consent in court.
THE PROPER FORUM FOR THE ACTION
Section 16(b) of the FLSA provides that an employee may
sue in any court of competent jurisdiction. This will permit you to
proceed in either a federal or a state court. Your choice of courts
will be based largely on matters of expediency or strategy. Under
the Act, the federal court will take jurisdiction regardless of
whether there is diversity of citizenship or whether the amount
exceeds $3000." You should note, however, that the jurisdiction
of the federal court may, in addition, be based upon other grounds.
Federal jurisdiction may thus exist because the cause is one which
exceeds $3,000 and is between citizens of different states, because
there is involved the enforcement of a penalty under the federal
laws, or because the law involved regulates interstate commerce.
You will understand the federal decisions better if you consider the
source of jurisdiction.7 So, for example, if the suit is for some-
thing other than minimum wages and overtime compensation and
not within the Act, a federal court may deny jurisdiction unless
it is shown that there is diversity of citizenship and the contro-
versy exceeds $3,000.8
There is no reason why our county court could not assume
jurisdiction if the amount does not exceed $2,000, but in estimating
the amount involved the court will include liquidated damages and
attorney's fees which are not considered costs, but are, in fact,
part of the allowable recovery. If the amount sought should be
beyond the court's jurisdiction, this would not oust the court but
would probably nullify the amount claimed beyond the jurisdictional
limitY Your most perplexing problems will concern the removal of
an action to the federal court after you have started it in the
county court. The decisions cannot be reconciled. It would seem
that since Congress provided that the action may be maintained in
any court of competent jurisdiction, it should be prosecuted to
final judgment in that court and not removed.1"
You will, of course, conduct the suit in accordance with the
rules of practice and procedure which are in effect in the court
where your action is brought. Where the procedural question is
not covered by the Act, you will follow the rules of the court. This
will be true on questions involving the capacity to sue, process,
aMaloy v. Friedman, 80 F. Supp. 290 (D.C. Ohio 1948) ; Robertson v. Argus Hos-
iery Mills, Inc., 121 Fed. 2d 285 (6th cir. 1941).
1 Federal jurisdiction may be based upon the amount of the controversy and diver-
sity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 41 (1) ; because you seek to enforce a penalty under
federal laws, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 371; or under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 41 (8) because the suit arises
under a law regulating commerce.
8See, for example: Schempf v. Armour & Co., 5 F.R.D. 294 (D.C. Minn. 1946)
Kantor v. Garchell, 150 Fed. 2d 47 (8th Cir. 1945).
'Caperna v. Williams-Bauer Corp., 9 Labor Cases, Sec. 62,607 (N.Y. 1945).
10Johnson v. Butler Bros., 162 F 2d 87 (C.C.A. Minn. 1947) ; Harris v. Reno Oil
Co., 48 F. Supp. 908 (D.C. Tex. 1943).
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venue, joinder of parties and causes of action, etc. Under the Act,
a union or one of its agents can no longer bring an action on be-
half of the employee. A minor will sue by his next friend. The
question of venue in the state court will be determined by our
Rule 98. You may have to determine whether the action is for
recovery of a penalty or on a contract, and the courts have differed
as to this matter. In the federal court the question would probably
be, determined by the rules and Section 51 of the Judicial Code
(28 USC Section 112). Our rules of procedure as to joinder of
parties and actions would seem to apply. Nevertheless, it should
be noted that under Section 16 (b) of the Act, the joinder of parties
and claims seems to be specifically provided for on the basis that
the employees are all similarly situated and the causes arise out
of the same set of circumstances. The federal courts have indi-
cated a very liberal attitude in permitting joinder of parties and
causes of action in one suit, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 16 of the Act.11
PLEADING REQUIRES JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATIONS
How shall you draft your complaint in this type of action?
For the most part, the sufficiency of the complaint will be deter-
mined by the appropriate Rules of Civil Procedure as in other
cases, but there are certain jurisdictional allegations which must
be set forth in the complaint. Your complaint should contain an
allegation not only of the interstate nature of the employer's busi-
ness but also of the facts which establish that the employee is
directly engaged in interstate commerce or in the production
of goods for such commerce. It may be deemed insufficient to
allege merely "that defendant was engaged in interstate com-
merce" or that the employee "worked directly in the production of
goods for commerce." Many of the courts have held that you must
allege more than mere conclusions to establish jurisdiction.1
2
The federal courts have differed as to how much should be set out
in the employee's complaint. Generally, however, they will try to
determine from the evidence on the trial the jurisdictional facts
and from a technical construction of the pleadings. As one
court stated, "Unless it appears with certainty from the com-
plaint that such employees would be entitled to no relief under the
facts stated, the complaint should not be dismissed,' 1 but there
are numerous cases which require specific allegations of the juris-
dictional facts in order to determine coverage of the Act. The
complaint should also contain a statement of the ultimate facts
which show that there existed a contractual relationship be-
ll For examples of joinder. see, Archer v. Musick, 147 Neb. 1018. 25 N.W. 2d 908
(1947) ; Keele v. Union Pac. R. Co., 78 F. Supp. 679 (D.C. Calif. 1949).
",W. S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 78 F. Supp. 616 (D.C. Mo. 1948) ; Baggett v. Henry
Riseher Packing Co., 37 F. Supp. 670 (D.C. Ky. 1941).
22Clyde v. Broderick, 144 Fed. 2d 348 (10th Cir. 1944); De Loach v. Crowley's,
Inc., 128 Fed. 2d 378 (5th Cir. 1942).
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tween your employee and the employer. Should you specify in the
complaint the hours of overtime due and the amount of under-
payment involved? Some courts have required that you plead
the exact months and time worked, holding that a mere allega-
tion that the employee was not paid the overtime provided by the
Act was insufficient. On the other hand, many of the federal courts
have held that it is not necessary to specifically allege the over-
time which may later appear from the evidence. 14 When an em-
ployee was employed by a company engaged in interstate and intra-
state commerce, the court required the complaint to set forth the
amount of time he worked in each classification and, where he
worked for two employers, the amount worked for each. 15 If you
bring a collective action on behalf of your employee and other em-
ployees similarly situated, it would seem advisable to set out
the names of these other employees. Your failure to set forth the
authority of the agent to bring the action for the others may ren-
der the complaint insufficient as to them. You must show on the
face of the complaint that the employees are similarly situated.
In several cases, however, the suit was held not subject to dismis-
sal on the grounds that the complaint did not name the employees
alleged to be similarly situated." In others, the employer was al-
lowed, by appropriate motions, to obtain their names. The judg-
ment will not affect those employees who did not submit to the
court's jurisdiction.
No SPECIAL RULES OF PLEADING REQUIRED
Apart from the question of jurisdiction there are really no
special rules of pleading which are unique in this class of cases.
The facts of each case will govern what you will do. The use of
motions will follow the general rules of practice and procedure.
Motions to dismiss the complaint because of insufficiency have
been denied by the federal courts unless it appeared with certain-
ty that the employee was entitled to no relief under any state
of facts. It it should appear, however, that there is no possible
claim, notwithstanding amendments, the court will dismiss the
proceeding rather than indulge in long and expensive litigation.
Motions to strike will generally be denied as in other cases, and
motions for summary judgment will be denied where the record
discloses any issue of fact which must be determined from evidence
which would be submitted at the trial. In actions involving Por-
talto-Portal activities where the complaint must show that the
claim should be paid under express provisions of a contract or
under a custom or practice in effect when the claim arose, the
" Compare Hunt v. National Linen Service Corp., 178 Tenn. 262, with Dykema v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 11 Labor Cases Sec. 63.414 (D.C. Ill. 1946).
15 Kldd v. Royal Crown Bottling Co., 6 Labor Cases Sec. 61,385 (Tenn. 1942).
16 Compare: Coleman v. Springsely Realty Corp., 6 Labor Cases, Sec. 61,406 (D.C.
N.Y. 1943) ; Calabrese v. Chiumento, 3 F.R.D. 435 (D.C. N.J. 1944) ; Dolan v. Day and
Zimmerman, Inc., 8 Labor Cases Sec. 62,189 (D).C. Mass. 1943).
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failure to allege this will justify a summary judgment or a motion
to dismiss.17 Sometimes an employer will move for security for
costs. The federal courts have generally rejected this motion
where the employees were residents or were employed within
the jurisdiction of the court. In Colorado, the right to such se-
curity would be governed by our general statute on costs.
The liberal use of counter claims and setoffs as provided for
in Rule 13 of our rules is also available to the employer in these
suits. The employer's counter-claim will be allowed even though
it does not arise out of the same facts. It is because of this that,
in one case, the employer was permitted to offset a debt owing to
him but only after liquidated damages for the employee were
computed.' 8
USE OF DISCOVERY AND DEPOSITION ESSENTIAL
A most important procedural device for successful litigation
is obtaining information before trial. Information regarding hours
worked, compensation received, rates of pay, premiums, and other
relevant matters may be secured under our rules for discovery
or depositions. The federal courts have on several occasions stated
that these rules may be employed only after the pleadings have
been formulated. A federal court held that one cannot take the
deposition of his employer for the purpose of discovering evidence
to enable him to frame a complaint. 19 He can do so only after the
action has been commenced. An employee will then have the right
to examine the books and records of the employer. The examina-
tion will be limited to the material records relating to the parties
to the action.20 Motions for inspection and discovery of employer's
books and records will be granted but subject to control by the
court. You may request admissions of fact from the employer,
thereby relieving you from the costs and labor of proving facts
which would not be disputed. Interrogatories have been allowed
where limited to the plaintiffs of record and to the period covered
by the complaint. Often the court will try to avoid the unreason-
able burden upon the employer of requiring him to compile a great
deal of information which may be of doubtful relevancy. It has
been held that discovery must be limited to the period of time
which would not be excluded by the statute of limitations.
What are your rights to a bill of particulars? You may ask
for a bill as a dilatory tactic, but if you really want it, your motion
will be considered in the light of several decisions. It will be denied
if you merely seek evidence; it will be denied if the pleadings
are definite enough to answer. Some of the courts have allowed
it only if necessary to answer but not to prepare for trial. A party
will not be entitled to it when he seeks discovery of matters
17 Hays v. hercules Powder Co., 13 Labor Cases see. 64,123 (ID.C. Mo. 19,47).
18 Barrineau v. Carolina Milling Co., 52 F. Supp. 197 (D.C. S.C. 1942).
1- Ferkauf v Leon Decorating Co., Inc., 3 F.R.D. 89 (D.C. N.Y. 1943).
20Fishman v. Marcouse, 32 F. Supp. 460 (D.C. Pa. 1940).
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which are within his own knowledge. Where employees have filed
a collective suit on behalf of themselves and others, the courts
have often granted bills of particular in order that the claim of
each employee might be definitely set forth, together with the
jurisdictional facts involved.21 Where several plaintiffs are in-
volved, it might facilitate a speedy and inexpensive determination
of the individual claims. They have thus required the employee
on occasions to furnish a bill which would separate the claims of
each, as it were, and furnish the names of the employees, the exact
work done, the period of time involved, etc. Where exemption is
pleaded by the employer as a separate defense, a bill of particu-
lars has been ordered, and where the employer asserted as a de-
fense that he had relied in good faith on an administrative regu-
lation, the employee was entitled to a bill of particulars setting
forth this regulation and the employer's acts in reliance on it.
You will not be allowed to procure information secured by
the Wage and Hour Division, for this is privileged. There will
be other confidential government records unavailable to you but
the discovery procedure available in both the federal and state
courts permits application to the court for a subpoena directing the
appearance and production of records or evidence when material
to the suit. Such subpoena will be enforceable by contempt pro-
ceedings where there is a violation.
THE BURDEN OF PROOF AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
The employee has the burden of proving by a preponderance
of evidence that he is entitled to recover. He must prove all the
essential elements of his claim. He has the burden of showing the
existence of the employer-employee relationship; that his activities
are within the coverage of the Act; that the employer has violated
the provisions of the Act to his damage. If he was engaged in
both interstate and intrastate commerce, he has the burden of
showing how much time he was employed in interstate com-
merce. He cannot claim violations of the Act based upon guess
work or speculation. His evidence must not be uncertain or con-
jectural. He cannot indicate in a general way how much overtime
work he performed. The court should not place upon an employee
a standard of proof which is so great as to be unrealistic. It is
held that his claim need not rest upon documentary evidence. In
other cases, where the employer has failed to keep records of his
employees and their hours and wages which the law requires. the
burden of proof will not shift to the employer, but the employee
will be allowed to show the amount and extent of his work as a
matter of reasonable inference..2 2 In many cases the employee
" Dolan v. Dan & Zimmerman, 8 Labor Cases, Sec. 62,189 (D.C. Mass. 1943):
Lemme v. V. La Rosa & Sons, 7 F.R.I). 485 (D.C.N.Y. 1947) ; Compare-Dykema v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 8 F.R.I). 230 (D.C. Ill. 1947).
22 Electron Corp. v. Wilkins, 14 Labor Cases, Sec. 64,234 (Colo. 1947); Davies v.
Onyx Oils and Resins, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 777 (D.C. N.J. 1946).
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tried to prove his case by self-kept records. These were usually
held not to sustain his burden of proof especially where they were
not kept daily and their accuracy and truthfulness were suspect.
There are no special rules concerning admission of evidence
which apply to employee suits. You should remember that the
rules applied in Colorado will be followed in the federal court for
Colorado. You might consider the decision of a few cases in this
field: self-serving declarations of an employee who kept a daily
record of his hours worked in order to make a claim against his
employer were held inadmissible; an employer cannot vary his
written contract by offering parol evidence to prove that lower
rates were agreed upon; but admissions against interest have been
held admissible. These admissions were interesting-an offer by
the employer to pay if the employee would drop his suit and give
a written release of all claims under the Act. The courts have ap-
plied the best evidence rule where the employer had failed to keep
records and the employee presented the best evidence which was
available.
You will get a feeling of what degree of proof is sufficient
to establish the employee's claim by reading the cases involved.
Time-clock records are important where they accurately reflect
the period worked, but they are never conclusive. The employer
may not establish an exclusive way of determining the hours
worked. Where employer kept no records and employee testified
positively of hours worked, which were not contradicted, such tes-
timony was held sufficient to entitle him to a judgment.2 3 Any
records of an employee which appear fabricated or which were
entered for the purpose of instituting a claim and were not made
currently, will be rejected. In some cases, disinterested witnesses
testified to corroborate the plaintiff's testimony, and a sufficient
showing was made. Mere general recollection by an employee of
this time worked, without more, was held insufficient. It has been
held that an employee need not prove with exact precision the
amount of overtime hours he worked. Where it was undisputed
that other employees were similarly situated with the plaintiff, a
recovery was warranted for them, even though they did not all
appear personally and testify.
24
Ji RY TRIAL, VERDICT AND APPEAL
You will probably want a jury. You will be entitled to a trial
by jury whether in federal court or in the state court. Your
demand should be in writing and within the period required by
our Rules of Civil Procedure. There are no special rules in an
"Campbell v. Mandel Auto Parts, 6 Labor Cases Sec. 61,557 (S.Y. 1943) ; On the
question of sufficiency, see: Lawley & Sons v. South, 140 Fed. 2d 439 (1st. Cir. 1944) ;
Murdick v. Cities Service Oil Co., 9 Labor Cases Sec. 62,389 (10th Cir. 1949) ; Richard-
son v. Duff, 194 S.W. 2d 389 (Ky. 1946).




employee suit concerning a jury trial, which differ from other
suits. The courts have said that the trial judge may not direct a
verdict where reasonable men draw different inferences from the
evidence. A jury's verdict supported by substantial evidence will
not be set aside. In one case it was set aside when the judgment
for the plaintiff was less than was warranted from the undisputed
evidence. It will be set aside where it is inconsistent or against the
weight of the evidence or based on a compromise or not responsive
to any finding of fact. Appeals from judgment in employees'
suits do not differ from other cases. A trial court's finding of facts,
where sufficient to sustain the judgment, will be binding upon the
appellate court unless clearly erroneous.
THE EMPLOYER'S DEFENSES
Now let us consider the employer. How shall he defend the
employee suit? He will not be liable if he can show that the em-
ployee was not an employee, or that he was not covered by the Act,
or that he was not employed at a wage below the legal minimum
or in excess of 40 hours a week. You should very carefully con-
sider the 1949 amendments to the Act on the question of coverage
or exemption. Many employees are now excluded from the Act
as the exemptions have been enlarged to a considerable extent-
they will include many retail and service establishments, laundries
and dry-cleaners, telephone and telegraph agencies, news boys,
employees of local newspapers, or taxicab operators and others.
Many of the exemptions will be administrative, and you must
search carefully to find them.
Considerable litigation has already indicated what other types
of defenses will be sustained or denied. If you justify the em-
ployer's conduct by a state law or some other federal law, or if
you offer an agreement or contract, all of which is contrary to the
Act or prohibited by it, your defense will not be sustained. There-
fore, employment contracts which provide that the parties shall
arbitrate wage disputes form a vilid defense.2 5 The employer
can not show that he offered a payment to the employee which
was accepted where the amount was not in accordance with the Act
or where he tendered overtime payment after it was due. In many
cases the employer has pleaded estoppel, e.g., that the employee
has consistently accepted less wages without protest, that he has
failed to make a demand for overtime wages, or that he has sub-
mitted false records. None of these defenses are sufficient to
avoid liability under the act.2 6 If you claim payment as a defense,
it must be for the full amount required. A prior judgment or a
dismissal with prejudice in a former action involving the same
25 St. Clair v. Russell and Pugh Lumber Co., 51 F. Supp. 47 (D.C. Idaho 1943).
26Block v. Bell, 53 F. Supp. 863 (D.C. Ky. 1945); Lawley & Sons v. South, 140
Fed. 2d 439 (1st Cir. 1944) ; Travis v. Ray, 41 F. Supp. 6 (D.C. Ky. 1941) ; Freeman
v. Blake Co., 84 F. Supp. 700 (D.C. Mass. 1949).
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parties and the same claim will, however, bar recovery in the later.
suit. If such a prior action is still pending, the later action should
be abated.
There are some very significant defenses which you must care-
fully consider. If you can show that your employer acted in good
faith in relying upon an administrative ruling which was in effect
and that he conformed to it innocently, this may constitute a bar
to an action for violations even though the administrative ruling
was later changed or rescinded. The Portal-to-Portal Act, which
supplements the FLSA, created this defense in order to protect
employers from the retroactive effects of changes brought about
by new administrative rulings or court decisions. The Portal-to-
Portal Act makes a distinction between the past acts or omissions
of the employer resulting from his reliance upon administrative
rulings which occurred prior to May 14, 1947 and those which
occurred subsequently. If the employer's acts or omissions were
prior to that date, the ruling upon which he relied as a defense
does not have to be in writing, and it may be any administrative
ruling of any federal agency. Those subsequent to May 14, 1947
must, however, be a written ruling or enforcement policy of the
Wage and Hour Administrator.
GOOD FAITH RELIANCE ON RULINGS
In such a case certain problems obviously arise. Is the ruling
or policy in fact that of the Wage and Hour Administration? Is
it an official ruling or a policy? If the Administrator fails to reply
to the employer to an inquiry, is this an administrative ruling?
If he abandons a court action or an appeal, must the Administrator
affirmatively act? Is the ruling applicable to the particular busi-
ness in which the employer is engaged? It has also been held that
before the employer's good faith reliance upon an administrative
practice is to relieve him from violations, such practice or policy
must be based upon the ground that the act did not violate the
FLSA and that the practice or policy of the Administrator in not
enforcing the Act with respect to the employer's acts or omissions
induced him to believe that he was not violating the Act. The em-
ployer must actually rely upon the administrative ruling or policy
and conform to it. There must be truly good faith. What consti-
tutes good faith on the part of the employer and whether he was
justified in believing that he was not violating the Act must be
determined by the particular circumstances of each case. 27 You
should carefully study the interpretive bulletins and court de-
cisions in considering this defense.
The employer's good faith is also important on the question
,7 For the test of good faith, see: Kam Koon Wan v. E. E. Block, Ltd., 14 Labor




of liquidated damages. The Act provides that an employee may
recover as liquidated damages an additional amount equal to the
unpaid compensation. At first an award of liquidated damages
was held mandatory upon the courts. Section II of the Portal-to-
Portal Act gave to the courts discretionary power to award or
withhold liquidated damages in these cases. This depends upon
the employer showing to the satisfaction of the court that he was
innocent and that his conduct was in good faith and was based
upon reasonable grounds for believing that he did not violate
the Act. This is obviously a question of fact which can only be
determined upon trial. The employee's claim for liquidated dam-
ages cannot be summarily overruled. Good faith should be pleaded
by the employer. You should also know that the employee cannot
recover interest on an award for liquidated damages.
An additional significant defense should here be mentioned.
It involves the statute of limitations. It is sufficient to state now
that the federal statute of limitations will govern all causes of ac-
tions and supercede our Colorado statute of limitations in these
employee suits. There is a two year statute of limitations for suits
under the FLSA as amended, and all causes of action arising prior
to January 5, 1950, the effective date of the 1949 amendment,
would be barred by the end of two years after that date. A cause
of action, for unpaid wages, accrues when the wages become due
and are not paid: There need be no demand for payment. The
employee's action is commenced on the date when the complaint
is filed with the court. In the case of a collective action or one
brought by an employee to enforce his rights and those of others
similarly situated, the action is not considered to begin for these
other employees until they have filed a written consent with
the court or have otherwise participated actively. This is in ac-
cordance with the Portal Act.
EMPLOYEE CLAIMS CANNOT BE COMPROMISED
If the employee has been paid in full under supervision of
the Wage and Hour Administration and has accepted such pay-
ment, this is a waiver of his rights for the benefits provided by the
Act. There is a similar waiver to the employee's right to liquidated
damages and attorney fees if he authorizes and consents to an
Administrator suit, but you will be confronted with a very signi-
ficant problem. Can you settle the employee's claim out of court
and obtain releases which will be valid? Our supreme court has
held that the Wage and Hour law confers statutory rights which
are affected with a public interest and, therefore, these rights can-
not be waived or released. In a series of decisions the court held
that the employee cannot waive or release or compromise his rights
to minimum wages or overtime pay or liquidated damages. He
cannot accept less than the full amount due him under the Act.
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He cannot release his claim for liquidated damages (prior to the
amendments of the Act). He cannot relinquish his claim to liqui-
dated damages by accepting full payment for overtime work where
the dispute involves coverage under the Act.2 8 Lower courts have
been in conflict as to the validity of compromised agreements
where there is a bona fide dispute as to the number of hours
worked by the employee. It is, therefore, very dangerous to com-
promise a employee's claim under the Act. There is, however, a
device which is available and which should accomplish this pur-
pose. Where a compromise agreement which is fair and equitable
has been merged in a judgment, when the parties appear before
the court and seek a consent decree, such a judgment would then
appear to be a bar to a later action.2 9 Should it be inequitable or
fraudulent, the solution would be a motion to set aside this judg-
ment which otherwise will remain in force.
INTERSTATE BAR COUNCIL MEETS IN DENVER
The Colorado Bar Association will be host this year to the
bar representatives of the eleven Western states which make up
the Interstate Bar Council. This council has for its purpose the
promotion and exchange of ideas on programs relating to the
welfare and improvement of the legal profession in this area.
The council will stage its annual meeting at the Brown Palace
in Denver on February 28, the day following the close of the mid-
winter meeting of the ABA House of Delegates in Chicago. Presi-
dent Edward G. Knowles will welcome the delegates in behalf of
the Colorado Bar Association and participate in the panel discus-
sion on bar association matters which will be presided over by
Harry J. McClean of the Los Angeles bar, chairman of the council.
President Fritz A. Nagel has arranged to accelerate the regu-
lar March meeting of the Denver Bar Association in order that
it may coincide with this occasion. A joint luncheon will be held
at the University Club in honor of the visitors from Arizona,
California, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah,
Washington and Wyoming. This promises to be one of the out-
standing programs of the year, and further notice as to the
speaker, subject and other arrangements will be given later.
Interested bar association members are also invited to drop
into the Tabor-Stratton Room of the Brown Palace at 10:00 a.m.
and 2 p.m. on Wednesday, February 28 to hear a lively panel dis-
cussion on the following subjects:
"Observe the decisions of the Supreme Court as they have developed: Brooklyn
Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697 (1944) ; Dize v. Maddrix, 324 U.S . (1945)
Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108 (1946).
2Bracey v. Luray, 161 Fed. 2d 128 (4th Cir. 1947).
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